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学者姓名：王颖林
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To promote the green transformation of agricultural supply chains, this paper develops and compares two types of low-carbon agricultural supply chain (LCAS) risk-incentive contracts: a government economic subsidy-based incentive scheme and a credit risk mitigation-based guarantee mechanism. Drawing on principal-agent theory, we examine potential risks during contract implementation and analyze how incentive coefficients affect the costs and benefits of LCAS projects under different contract structures. We further integrate Leontief's input-output framework to assess the economic resilience of these contracts under demand shocks. The findings make three contributions. Theoretically, the study bridges contract theory and input-output modeling to evaluate LCAS risk-sharing. Empirically, the results show that: (1) government adjustment of incentive coefficients is crucial for balancing risk allocation and project returns; (2) moderate credit risk mitigation participation enhances revenue stability, while excessive reliance increases risk-transfer costs; and (3) information disclosure and regulatory oversight are essential for aligning stakeholder incentives. From a policy perspective, the study provides actionable guidance for designing incentive mechanisms and financial guarantees that strengthen LCAS sustainability and investment attractiveness.
Keyword ：
Credit Risk Mitigation Credit Risk Mitigation Government economic subsidy Government economic subsidy Low-carbon agricultural supply chains Low-carbon agricultural supply chains Resilience assessment Resilience assessment
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| GB/T 7714 | Wang, Yinglin , Shi, Shengxu , Xu, Hong et al. Government economic subsidies or credit risk mitigation: incentive contracts and resilience assessment in low-carbon agricultural supply chains [J]. | EXPERT SYSTEMS WITH APPLICATIONS , 2026 , 299 . |
| MLA | Wang, Yinglin et al. "Government economic subsidies or credit risk mitigation: incentive contracts and resilience assessment in low-carbon agricultural supply chains" . | EXPERT SYSTEMS WITH APPLICATIONS 299 (2026) . |
| APA | Wang, Yinglin , Shi, Shengxu , Xu, Hong , Zhao, Yuxin , Gu, Feng . Government economic subsidies or credit risk mitigation: incentive contracts and resilience assessment in low-carbon agricultural supply chains . | EXPERT SYSTEMS WITH APPLICATIONS , 2026 , 299 . |
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This paper focuses on the economic resilience aspects of the financialization of infrastructure projects concerning enhancing market dynamics and risk regulation. We examined 39 infrastructure REITs listed in China between June 2021 and June 2024. Utilizing an economic resilience evaluation model to assess the resistance and recovery capacities of these infrastructure REITs, we incorporate seven investor heterogeneity measures. A geographic detector model is employed to analyze divergence, identify key determinant factors, pinpoint risk zones, and investigate the interaction between these measures within the context of PPP-REITs and DI-REITs. The empirical results show that the investor ratio and expected investment tenure are critical to the construction of economic resilience indices for infrastructure REITs. Also, the interaction of factors holds significance toward influencing the divergence in economic resilience. Our findings reveal a "barrel effect" of investor heterogeneity in infrastructure project financial products, indicating a consistency between economic resilience and investor heterogeneity. By integrating the investor heterogeneity index into the resilience evaluation framework of infrastructure REITs, this study offers valuable insights into the risk-resistance capacity of infrastructure financial products and the enhancement of economic resilience in these projects.
Keyword ：
economic resilience economic resilience geographic detector model geographic detector model infrastructure REITs infrastructure REITs investor heterogeneity investor heterogeneity
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| GB/T 7714 | Zheng, Jinying , Yan, Ziying , Liu, Jicai et al. Evaluation of REITs resilience of infrastructure projects from the perspective of investor heterogeneity based on Geodetector Models--Empirical data from China [J]. | FRONTIERS OF ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT , 2025 , 12 (4) : 793-808 . |
| MLA | Zheng, Jinying et al. "Evaluation of REITs resilience of infrastructure projects from the perspective of investor heterogeneity based on Geodetector Models--Empirical data from China" . | FRONTIERS OF ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT 12 . 4 (2025) : 793-808 . |
| APA | Zheng, Jinying , Yan, Ziying , Liu, Jicai , Wang, Yinglin . Evaluation of REITs resilience of infrastructure projects from the perspective of investor heterogeneity based on Geodetector Models--Empirical data from China . | FRONTIERS OF ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT , 2025 , 12 (4) , 793-808 . |
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To alleviate the financial burden of supporting ESG disclosures, this study introduces third-party institutions and proposes two alternative models: GFSL (Guarantee First, Subsidy Later) and SFGL (Subsidy First, Guarantee Later). Using evolutionary game theory, it analyzes strategic decisions and compares models through numerical simulations. Results show that subsidy caps and premium levels must be balanced carefully. SFGL suits cases with minimal external influence, while FGS with dynamic incentives fits strong responders. For opportunistic enterprises, SFGL is preferred. This study offers theoretical insights and practical guidance for optimizing ESG subsidy strategies and advancing sustainable finance.
Keyword ：
ESG enterprises ESG enterprises evolutionary game evolutionary game government subsidy government subsidy guarantee incentive strategies guarantee incentive strategies third-party guarantee third-party guarantee
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| GB/T 7714 | Zhuang, Jiaxin , Wang, Yinglin , Shi, Shengxu . ESG Enterprise Hybrid Risk Diversification Mechanism Based on Third-Party Guarantee [J]. | MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS , 2025 , 46 (7) : 4032-4055 . |
| MLA | Zhuang, Jiaxin et al. "ESG Enterprise Hybrid Risk Diversification Mechanism Based on Third-Party Guarantee" . | MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS 46 . 7 (2025) : 4032-4055 . |
| APA | Zhuang, Jiaxin , Wang, Yinglin , Shi, Shengxu . ESG Enterprise Hybrid Risk Diversification Mechanism Based on Third-Party Guarantee . | MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS , 2025 , 46 (7) , 4032-4055 . |
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With the rapid development of intelligent technologies, the intelligent decarbonization transformation of construction firms has garnered widespread attention from many countries and regions. Based on the theory of innovation diffusion, this paper innovatively examined the policy response from the perspectives of leading and following firms. By constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model, the different impacts of carbon tax incentives and economic subsidy mechanisms on the intelligent transformation behavior of firms were explored. The study found that (1) carbon tax incentives and economic subsidies effectively promote the realization of intelligent transformation of construction firms, and the social benefits brought about by the transformation further enhance the government's motivation to implement the policy, forming a virtuous circle; (2) social benefits are an important basis for government policy-making-when the social benefits of the transformation are considerable, the government tends to implement economic subsidy policies; conversely, carbon tax incentive policies are more appropriate; (3) there is an optimal range for subsidy policies, and the government should cautiously set the level of subsidies to ensure the sustainability and effectiveness of the policies; and (4) efficient carbon reduction and tax incentives can effectively alleviate the long-term tax burden on firms, whereas adequate government subsidies help firms reduce the financial burden in the early stages of transformation. The two incentive mechanisms for the intelligent transformation of the construction industry proposed in this paper highlight the crucial role of policy tools in driving the industry's low-carbon transition. The research provides theoretical foundations and practical guidance for policy formulation.
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| GB/T 7714 | Wang, Yinglin , Hu, Yuwei , Zhuang, Jiaxin et al. Tripartite Evolution Game of Intelligent Carbon Reduction Transformation in the Construction Industry: A Comparative Analysis of Carbon-Tax Incentives and Financial Subsidies [J]. | JOURNAL OF CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT , 2025 , 151 (10) . |
| MLA | Wang, Yinglin et al. "Tripartite Evolution Game of Intelligent Carbon Reduction Transformation in the Construction Industry: A Comparative Analysis of Carbon-Tax Incentives and Financial Subsidies" . | JOURNAL OF CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT 151 . 10 (2025) . |
| APA | Wang, Yinglin , Hu, Yuwei , Zhuang, Jiaxin , Xu, Hong . Tripartite Evolution Game of Intelligent Carbon Reduction Transformation in the Construction Industry: A Comparative Analysis of Carbon-Tax Incentives and Financial Subsidies . | JOURNAL OF CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT , 2025 , 151 (10) . |
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As global energy demand grows and the focus on environmental sustainability intensifies, wind energy, as a form of clean energy, plays a pivotal role in the global energy transition. The public-private partnership (PPP) model, by integrating resources from both the public and private sectors, effectively propels the implementation of wind energy projects. However, these projects face a myriad of risks during both development and operation, making effective risk management crucial to project success. This paper, through literature analysis and System Dynamics methodology, develops a risk diversification indicator system that covers the entire project lifecycle. In addition, by combining the improved G1 weighting method and the entropy method, a dynamic risk model is established. Furthermore, through numerical simulation and sensitivity analysis, the risk levels of each subsystem and the key boundary risk factors are identified, and a set of highly adaptable risk diversification strategies is proposed. These strategies will enhance the resilience of wind energy PPP projects, foster trust among stakeholders, help participants effectively respond to and predict risk evolution, improve the project's risk tolerance, and ensure its long-term sustainable operation.
Keyword ：
boundary risks boundary risks renewable energy renewable energy risk diversification risk diversification System Dynamics System Dynamics wind energy PPP projects wind energy PPP projects
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| GB/T 7714 | Lai, Rongji , Liu, Shiying , Wang, Yinglin . Sustainable Operations: Risk Evolution and Diversification Strategies Throughout the Lifecycle of Wind Energy Public-Private Partnership Projects [J]. | SYSTEMS , 2025 , 13 (4) . |
| MLA | Lai, Rongji et al. "Sustainable Operations: Risk Evolution and Diversification Strategies Throughout the Lifecycle of Wind Energy Public-Private Partnership Projects" . | SYSTEMS 13 . 4 (2025) . |
| APA | Lai, Rongji , Liu, Shiying , Wang, Yinglin . Sustainable Operations: Risk Evolution and Diversification Strategies Throughout the Lifecycle of Wind Energy Public-Private Partnership Projects . | SYSTEMS , 2025 , 13 (4) . |
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With the rapid development of the prefabricated building industry, the green supply chain of prefabricated buildings has become a key driver of sustainable development and efficiency improvement in the industry. However, the issue of benefit distribution arising from cooperation has become the main challenge affecting the long-term stability of the supply chain. To address this, this study proposes an improved TFN-TOPSIS-Banzhaf value model, which optimizes the benefit distribution in the green supply chain of prefabricated buildings using cooperative game theory. This approach enhances both the fairness and accuracy of the distribution. The model integrates a combination of subjective and objective weighting methods based on triangular fuzzy numbers and the M-TOPSIS method for multi-factor evaluation, resulting in the corrected weight coefficients. By combining the weighting coefficients and least squares contributions, the improved Banzhaf value based on players' weighted least squares contributions is constructed. The effectiveness and robustness of the model are verified through a case analysis, which significantly enhances the model's ability to handle supply chain synergies and achieves a more fair and precise benefit distribution. This research provides an effective benefit distribution tool for the prefabricated building industry, promoting the continuous development of green building practices and supply chain cooperation.
Keyword ：
Banzhaf value Banzhaf value cooperative game cooperative game prefabricated buildings prefabricated buildings supply chain supply chain TOPSIS TOPSIS
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| GB/T 7714 | Lai, Rongji , Liu, Shiying , Wang, Yinglin . Optimization of Benefit Distribution in Green Supply Chain for Prefabricated Buildings Based on TFN-TOPSIS-Banzhaf Cooperative Game Theory [J]. | BUILDINGS , 2025 , 15 (6) . |
| MLA | Lai, Rongji et al. "Optimization of Benefit Distribution in Green Supply Chain for Prefabricated Buildings Based on TFN-TOPSIS-Banzhaf Cooperative Game Theory" . | BUILDINGS 15 . 6 (2025) . |
| APA | Lai, Rongji , Liu, Shiying , Wang, Yinglin . Optimization of Benefit Distribution in Green Supply Chain for Prefabricated Buildings Based on TFN-TOPSIS-Banzhaf Cooperative Game Theory . | BUILDINGS , 2025 , 15 (6) . |
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PurposeThis study explores how Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) information disclosure affects carbon reduction efficiency in the construction industry. It identifies key ESG factors and analyzes the interaction mechanisms between governments and enterprises, aiming to develop a structured framework that promotes transparency, informs policy design, and enhances collaborative governance for sustainable construction.Design/methodology/approachA two-stage research design is employed. First, the DEMATEL-AISM approach is used to examine the causal relationships and hierarchical structure among 14 ESG-related factors, clarifying their influence pathways. Second, an evolutionary game model simulates strategic interactions between governments and construction firms under different parameter settings, including effort levels, environmental benefit coefficients, and reciprocity preferences. Sensitivity analysis is conducted to assess how these variables affect long-term strategic convergence.FindingsThe DEMATEL-AISM analysis identifies three core ESG drivers with the highest centrality and causal impact in the construction sector: S1 (subsidy and incentive mechanisms), S2 (information-sharing level), and G1 (technological innovation). Evolutionary game simulations reveal that cooperative strategies between governments and enterprises are more likely when the ESG quality standard (S0) exceeds 0.7 or when fixed incentives (SF) remain modest (SF = 0.2). Among all variables, the government's variable compensation coefficient (lambda) plays the most decisive role in influencing enterprise disclosure behavior, highlighting the critical role of dynamic incentives in steering collaborative action.Originality/valueUnlike prior studies that focus predominantly on empirical assessments or static models, this research integrates causal analysis with dynamic simulation to examine ESG disclosure mechanisms tailored to the construction industry. By modeling the interplay between information-sharing and strategic incentives, it offers a novel perspective on how targeted policy parameters can enhance ESG performance and carbon reduction. The findings provide actionable insights for designing effective incentive frameworks and improving stakeholder collaboration in sustainable construction governance.
Keyword ：
Carbon reduction efficiency Carbon reduction efficiency Construction industry Construction industry DEMATEL-AISM DEMATEL-AISM ESG disclosure ESG disclosure Evolutionary game Evolutionary game Policy incentives Policy incentives
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| GB/T 7714 | Wang, Yinglin , Lin, Weidong , Yan, Ziying et al. Mechanism for improving carbon reduction efficiency in the construction industry based on ESG information disclosure [J]. | ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION AND ARCHITECTURAL MANAGEMENT , 2025 . |
| MLA | Wang, Yinglin et al. "Mechanism for improving carbon reduction efficiency in the construction industry based on ESG information disclosure" . | ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION AND ARCHITECTURAL MANAGEMENT (2025) . |
| APA | Wang, Yinglin , Lin, Weidong , Yan, Ziying , Hu, Yuwei . Mechanism for improving carbon reduction efficiency in the construction industry based on ESG information disclosure . | ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION AND ARCHITECTURAL MANAGEMENT , 2025 . |
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In response to the global increase in construction safety incidents and the intertwined challenges of dynamism, complexity, and uncertainty in smart site safety management, this study proposes a resilience evaluation framework that integrates system-theoretic accident model and processes (STAMP), the man, machine, material, method, environment methodology (4M1E), and the cloud model. A Delphi-based approach is employed to construct a 26-indicator system across four dimensions: personnel, machinery, construction process, and environment. Decision making trial and evaluation laboratory-adversarial interpretive structural modeling (DEMATEL-AISM) method is then applied to identify the key driving factors and hierarchical causal paths. Finally, a cloud model is employed to quantitatively characterize the resilience levels of individual subsystems. The findings identify key indicators and their interaction pathways that are crucial for improving safety resilience in smart construction sites. The proposed evaluation framework is validated for effectiveness and offers an optimized path for resilience system development. This study provides a systematic and adaptive methodological foundation, contributing both theoretical innovation and practical guidance for the standardized advancement of smart site safety management.
Keyword ：
Accidents Accidents Analytical models Analytical models Artificial intelligence Artificial intelligence Cloud computing Cloud computing cloud model cloud model construction industry construction industry decision making decision making Real-time systems Real-time systems Resilience Resilience Safety Safety Safety management Safety management Systematics Systematics system safety system safety Uncertainty Uncertainty
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| GB/T 7714 | Wang, Yinglin , Xu, Hong , Zhao, Yuxin . A Resilience Evaluation Framework for Smart Construction Sites Using the 4M1E-STAMP Approach and Cloud Model [J]. | IEEE ACCESS , 2025 , 13 : 153557-153576 . |
| MLA | Wang, Yinglin et al. "A Resilience Evaluation Framework for Smart Construction Sites Using the 4M1E-STAMP Approach and Cloud Model" . | IEEE ACCESS 13 (2025) : 153557-153576 . |
| APA | Wang, Yinglin , Xu, Hong , Zhao, Yuxin . A Resilience Evaluation Framework for Smart Construction Sites Using the 4M1E-STAMP Approach and Cloud Model . | IEEE ACCESS , 2025 , 13 , 153557-153576 . |
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Tax incentives are a powerful driver for the development of infrastructure real estate investment trusts (REITs). Complementary antiavoidance regulations are essential to ensure the sustainable and healthy development of the REIT market. This paper breaks through the traditional policy approach that emphasizes incentives but neglects supervision. Based on factors such as information asymmetry and regulatory capture, a tripartite game model of REIT tax incentives and antiavoidance regulation is established. Utilizing global REIT policy and market data, the paper sets parameter values and conducts numerical simulations to explore the dynamic strategic interaction mechanisms among the government, REIT stakeholders, and financial regulators. The study finds that (1) government's tax incentive policies and regulatory strategies show a phase transition characteristic with the changes of REIT market returns; and (2) based on the project's profit status, financial regulators and investors are prone to develop a collusive avoidance evolutionary strategy. Therefore, antiavoidance regulations and mechanisms to prevent regulatory capture should be implemented in tandem to ensure the efficiency of tax incentives. The conclusion of the study provides a theoretical basis for the formulation of REIT tax incentive policy and the promotion of the sustainable development of the REIT market.
Keyword ：
Antiavoidance Antiavoidance Real estate investment trusts (REITs) Real estate investment trusts (REITs) Tax incentives Tax incentives Tripartite evolutionary game Tripartite evolutionary game
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| GB/T 7714 | Wang, Yinglin , Zhuang, Jiaxin , Lai, Rongji et al. A Tripartite Governance Strategy for Infrastructure REITs Considering Tax Incentives and Antiavoidance Regulations [J]. | JOURNAL OF CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT , 2024 , 150 (11) . |
| MLA | Wang, Yinglin et al. "A Tripartite Governance Strategy for Infrastructure REITs Considering Tax Incentives and Antiavoidance Regulations" . | JOURNAL OF CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT 150 . 11 (2024) . |
| APA | Wang, Yinglin , Zhuang, Jiaxin , Lai, Rongji , Chen, Leqi . A Tripartite Governance Strategy for Infrastructure REITs Considering Tax Incentives and Antiavoidance Regulations . | JOURNAL OF CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT , 2024 , 150 (11) . |
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Considering the fairness preference of investors, this paper sets up a dynamically adjust able excessive revenue distribution and incentive mechanism according to the income of transportation PPP projects, in or der to determine the excessive revenue of the government and social capital and dynamically adjust the distribution coefficient. The study shows that the in crease of investors' fairness preference will make it easier for investors to achieve high effort behaviour choices. The coefficient of fairness preference is closely related to the proportion of excess return risk, which influences the re ward and punishment mechanism.
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| GB/T 7714 | Wang, Yinglin , Chen, Leqi , Zhuang, Jiaxin et al. Research on Excessive Revenue Distribution and Incentive Mechanism of Transportation PPP Projects from the Perspective of Fairness Preference [J]. | JOURNAL OF TRANSPORT ECONOMICS AND POLICY , 2024 , 58 : 99-126 . |
| MLA | Wang, Yinglin et al. "Research on Excessive Revenue Distribution and Incentive Mechanism of Transportation PPP Projects from the Perspective of Fairness Preference" . | JOURNAL OF TRANSPORT ECONOMICS AND POLICY 58 (2024) : 99-126 . |
| APA | Wang, Yinglin , Chen, Leqi , Zhuang, Jiaxin , Li, Yulong . Research on Excessive Revenue Distribution and Incentive Mechanism of Transportation PPP Projects from the Perspective of Fairness Preference . | JOURNAL OF TRANSPORT ECONOMICS AND POLICY , 2024 , 58 , 99-126 . |
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